The globalisation of commerce combined with the projected growth of global nuclear capacity by 2050, presents both new opportunities and emerging challenges for the nuclear supply chain. In this context, regulators have expressed growing concerns about the potential rise of counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items (CFSI) infiltrating the nuclear supply chain.

In recent years, several cases of CFSI have been identified in countries, particularly related to modified (falsified) certificates and counterfeit equipment already delivered within the nuclear industry. While some of these cases highlight gaps in safety culture within the supply chain, they also underscore the urgent need to improve detection and prevention mechanisms across the industry and regulators.

The nuclear industry recognises significant risks posed by CFSI and acknowledges the need to strengthen procurement processes, supply chain organisational culture, quality assurance/quality control activities and sharing of CFSI events. Addressing these challenges with CFSI — through enhanced quality control, better detection practices, safety culture, sharing the information and targeted training — will help reinforce organisational resilience and ensure the continued safety and integrity of nuclear operations.

The Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) Working Group on Supply Chain (WGSUP) was formed in 2023. The purpose of the CNRA WGSUP is to build on the previous group’s progress and collaborate on supply chain (SC) regulatory activities (WGSUP mandate). The group’s mandate can be summarised as:

• Share good practice and enhance supply chain regulatory oversight approaches;
• Collaborate on vendor inspections and share the outcomes of inspection programmes;
• Leverage our collective regulatory position and resource; and, 
• Focus regulators, licensees and vendors on the areas of greatest risk.

To achieve its purposes, it is essential that the group engages with industry and the Standards Development Organisations (SDO’s) to consider areas of emerging risk and enable enhancements to support efficient and effective regulation.

This workshop has been developed in partnership with other CNRA working group: WGHOF and EGOE and partners as the World Nuclear Association (WNA) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to align, where appropriate, the improvement and oversight activity of the industry, its regulators and SDO’s.

This new work will aim to build on the successful 2018 and 2024 CNRA-WGSUP Workshop on Nuclear Supply Chain (2018 workshop proceedings and 2024 workshop proceedings) which both identified the CFSI as a risk for the nuclear industry.

The recommendations from the 2024 supply chain workshop have been reviewed by regulators, licensees, nuclear suppliers, as well as international and non-governmental organisations. Among them, three key recommendations focus on mitigating CFSI risks, strengthening organisational culture and leadership, and defining a clear stance on organisational culture. The 2026 CFSI workshop will address these recommendations.

Following this workshop, the CNRA will publish the proceedings to facilitate the dissemination of its key messages. These proceedings will feature a set of recommendations intended for consideration by regulators, licensees, nuclear suppliers, as well as international and non-governmental organizations.

The workshop will be held over two days on 7-8 October 2026. It will be structured around the following four sessions and will include keynote speeches from regulators and industry leaders and insights from related high-risk industries.

The sessions will be also focused on the corrective actions, recommendations to enhance the CFSI prevention and detection processes.

Audience perspectives will be obtained throughout the workshop via panel questions and answers sections. In addition, a dedicated interactive thread will be utilised to obtain audience perception of key risks, challenges and opportunities to maximise attendee participation.

• Session 1 - To consider the current situation of counterfeit, fraudulent and suspect items (CFSI) within the supply chain and the challenges faced by the industry;
• Session 2 - To consider the root causes of CFSI and the most commonly impacted areas, with a focus on organisational factors and leadership;
• Session 3 - To consider the prevention of CFSI, as well as the implementation and monitoring of an organisational culture within the supply chain. This session will also address the use of whistleblowing systems as tools to prevent and report CFSI; and, 
• Session 4 - To consider the tools used to control and detect CFSI before such items enter the nuclear supply chain. This session will also examine the use of new technologies such as AI as a means to detect CFSI.

The Programme Committee (PC) members for the developing of the programme and preparation for the workshop are:

• Jeremy Hubert, ASNR, France (WGSUP Chair)
• Dan Papaz, CNSC, Canada (WGSUP Vice-Chair) 
• Stuart Allen, ONR, UK
• Sean Peters, NRC, US (WGHOF Chair)
• Marc McBride, ONR, UK (WGLSC Chair)
• Julien Husse, ASNR, France (EGOE Vice-Chair)